

Message Text

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S E C R E T ANKARA 3135

EXDIS

FROM HARTMAN

EO 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, TU, GR, CY

SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER

1. BILL MACOMBER AND I, TOGETHER WITH BILL EAGLETON, MET FOR A TOTAL OF FOUR HOURS TODAY WITH CAGLAYANGIL (A FULL REPORT FOLLOWS IN SEPTEL). CAGLAYANGIL HEARD ME OUT ON THE CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION AND SEEMED TO RECOGNIZE WHY THE PROCESS HAD BEEN SLOWED BY THE CONGRESSIONAL FOCUS ON VIETNAM. AT THE SAME TIME HE EMPHASIZED THAT VIETNAM DEVELOPMENTS MADE IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT CONGRESS ACT PROMPTLY. DESPITE MY EFFORTS NOT TO LINK PROGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS (SOME VISIBLE SIGN OF MOVEMENT, I SAID), CAGLAYANGIL TOOK SAME LINE DEMIREL HAD TAKEN WITH US LAST MONTH, THAT NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA SHOULD PROCEED NORMALLY AND THERE WOULD BE NO CONCESSIONS GIVEN IN ADVANCE.

2. HE EXPLAINED IN SOME DETAIL THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES FACED BY THE COALITION AND WHY HE COULD NOT JUSTIFY IMMEDIATE TURKISH CONCESSIONS TO FACILITATE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE UPSHOT OF THIS DISCUSSION WAS A CLEAR MESSAGE THAT THE DENKTASH-CLERIDES TALKS SHOULD PROCEED; THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO ENTER INTO DIRECT TALKS WITH GREECE TO SETTLE ALL ISSUES; AND THAT THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION SHOULD CONVINCE CONGRESS TO CHANGE ITS VIEW. HIS

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SCENARIO FOR GREEK-TURKISH TALKS WAS: FIRST, A REALISTIC AND

WORKMANLIKE NEGOTIATION AT VIENNA; SECOND, PREPARATION AT A HIGH OFFICIAL LEVEL, BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY; THEN A MEETING BETWEEN HIMSELF AND BITSIOS; AND FINALLY A MEETING BETWEEN DEMIREL AND CARAMANLIS AT THE NATO SUMMIT. ESENBEL WILL REQUEST A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT ON HIS RETURN NEXT WEEK AND HE WILL WISH TO DISCUSS A MEETING BETWEEN DEMIREL AND THE PRESIDENT IN BRUSSELS. HE IMPLIED THAT WE MIGHT PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE IN THE GREEK-TURK DISCUSSIONS IN BRUSSELS. HE CONCLUDED THAT WE SHOULD USE AGREEMENT ON THIS KIND OF SCENARIO AS A SPUR TO CONGRESSIONAL ACTION.

3. AT VARIOUS TIMES, I BROUGHT UP OUR CONCERNs ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AEGEAN. I STRESSED OUR CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS NO REASON THAT WE COULD SEE WHY THESE MATTERS COULD NOT BE SETTLED AMICABLY. CAGLAYANGIL INCLUDED THE AEGEAN AS A PRIME PROBLEM TO BE DEALT WITH BILATERALLY. HE EXPRESSED GREAT RESPECT FOR CARAMANLIS BUT STRESSED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO DEAL FRANKLY AND DIRECTLY WITH TURKEY ON THESE ISSUES. HE RECALLED THE POSITION WHICH HE HIMSELF ADOPTED IN 1967 (AT SOME POLITICAL COST) TO DEFUSE THE CYPRUS SITUATION BY WORKING THROUGH CYRUS VANCE WHILE SIMULTANOUSLY NEGOTIATING DIRECTLY WITH THE GREEKS.

4. WHILE NO SPECIFIC ACTION AGAINST OUR FACILITIES WAS MENTIONED AND HE LATER TURNED ASIDE A PRESS QUESTION ON THIS SUBJECT, THERE WAS MUCH STRESS ON THE INABILITY TO HOLD TURKISH OPINION IN FAVOR OF A CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. HE SAID THAT THE VIETNAM SITUATION HEIGHTENED CONCERN IN TURKEY ON THE VALUE OF MAINTAINING US TIES.

5. TOMORROW WE SEE ECEVIT AND DEMIREL. I SEE NO POINT IN PRESSING THE FRAMEWORK IDEA SINCE CAGLAYANGIL REJECTED THAT APPROACH. HE WOULD GO NO FURTHER THAN SAYING THEY ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE ON THE LINE IN CYPRUS. HE ALSO HINTED THAT DENKTASH MIGHT REVIVE THE AIRPORT AND PORT OF FAMAGUSTA PROPOSALS TO BETTER THE ATMOSPHERE BY SOME EARLY AGREEMENT IN VIENNA.

6. LAST COMMENT MADE BY CAGLAYANGIL PERHAPS BEST ILLUSTRATES HIS APPROACH. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ON WHETHER TURKISH COALITION WOULD GO ALONG WITH NEGOTIATED SOLUTION, HE SAID HE WOULD BE THE COOK AND PREPARE THIS MEAL. HE WOULD THEN

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PRESENT IT TO THE JUSTICE PARTY PARTNERS FOR THEIR APPROVAL OR REJECTION. WITH THEIR APPROVAL HE WOULD THEN OBTAIN RPP ASSENT. HE STRESSED THAT BOTH GREEK AND TURK GOVERNMENTS HAVE POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND COMPROMISES MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THESE ON BOTH SIDES.

MACOMBER

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